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 he war against Al Qaeda and its allies may well become the defining conflict of our 
age. Certainly it is cited as evidence of a transformation of war that is sweeping 
away older modes of warfare. 2  In theory at least 9/11 represented something new 
in the spectrum of conflict in the sense that the attack was planned and orchestrated 
by a trans national non-state actor „with more lethal potential than any other nonstate threat‟ 
faced by a nation state.‟3.  As George Bush explained in a speech to West Point Graduates in 
2002: 
 
In defending the peace, we face a threat with no precedent. Enemies in the past needed great 
armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger the American people and our nation. The 
                                                 
1
 Defence Studies Department, King‟s College London, Joint Services Command and Staff College. The 
views expressed in this paper are the author‟s own and do not reflect the official position of MOD or the 
British Government. 
2 For an overview of how political and economic trends are changing the nature of war see Mary Kaldor 
New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in the Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007),  and Herfried 
Munkler The New Wars (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005). For an overview of how the conduct of war is 
evolving see Thomas Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St Paul, M.N.: 
Zenith Press, 2004), Rod Thornton, Asymmetric Warfare (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006) and Richard H. 
Shultz Jnr and Andrea J. Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2006). 
3 Michael Scheuer, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam and the Future of America 
(Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2006), p.3. 
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attacks of September the 11th required a few hundred thousand dollars in the hands of a few 
dozen evil and deluded men. All of the chaos and suffering they caused came at much less than 
the cost of a single tank. 4 
 
Not only did the attack result in over 3,000 deaths, equally important was the longer term 
effect of this event.  Osama bin Laden later claimed the attack had cost a paltry $500,000 to 
finance but had resulted in $500 billion in damages to the US economy.  This single act 
signalled that terrorism had evolved from being a tactical to a strategic instrument of war.5  Of 
longer term significance, however, is the fact that Al Qaeda has not merely survived the war 
waged against it by the United States and its allies, but has continued to organise and 
orchestrate attacks against the West and apostate regimes in „Islamdom‟.  It is interesting that 
whilst the US State Department‟s strategic assessment in 2007 referred to the successful efforts 
of the international community in the creation of a `less permissive environment for terrorists, 
keeping their leaders on the move or in hiding, and degrading their ability to plan and mount 
attacks‟, but they also acknowledged that Al Qaeda retained the `operational capability to 
mount large scale spectacular attacks, including on the United States and other high profile 
Western targets.‟6 This depressing assessment was reaffirmed by the British Foreign Affairs 
Committee, in spite of the success in targeting Al Qaeda‟s leadership hierarchy and their 
organisational infrastructure, in their view: ` the danger of international terrorism, whether 
from Al Qaeda or other related groups, has not diminished and may well have increased.  Al 
Qaeda continues to pose an extremely serious and brutal threat to the United Kingdom and its 
interests.7  This bleak assessment was also supported by the independent think tank the 
International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), they believe that Al Qaeda is stronger today 
                                                 
4 President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point, June 1 2002. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/200020601-3.html Accessed on 24/07/07. 
5 Angel Rabassa, Beyond al-Qaeda: The Global Jihadist Movement Part 1 (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand 
Corporation, 2006), p.24. 
6 US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism (April, 2007) Chapter 1 Strategic Assessment 
http://www.state.gov/sct/rls/crt/2006/82727.htm Accessed on 21 May 2007 
7 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (HCFAC), Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against 
Terrorism HC 573, (London: HMSO, 2006), p.19. 
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than it was in 2001 and it still has the capacity to conduct an attack on the scale of 9/11.8  The 
fact that western forces appear to be currently bogged down in an insurgency in Afghanistan 
and is becoming increasingly concerned about Al Qaeda‟s activities in both North and Sub-
Saharan Africa, reinforces the impression that the West is actually losing this conflict. A poll 
conducted in 2010 found that only 37 percent of Americans believed the United States and its 
allies are winning the war on terror.9  
 
This paper seeks to explain the reasons for the failure of the military campaign so far, but looks 
at this debate from the perspective of the British rather than the American experience of the 
war on terror.  Britain‟s military strategy against international terrorism is a subject that has 
not received a great deal of attention or analysis, which is interesting given that the United 
Kingdom (UK) has provided a vital military contribution in the prosecution of this war.  A 
further point which makes the UK interesting as a case study is that its armed forces possess a 
wealth of experience in counter terrorism and counter insurgency and yet, in spite of this, it 
struggled to get to grips with the various militias operating in its area of operations in Iraq 
between 2003 and 2009 and its involvement in Afghanistan has proven to be costly in terms of 
both blood and treasure.  Although much of this failure can be laid at the door of the Bush 
Administration‟s poor policy on Iraq and Afghanistan, and its wider foreign policy in the 
Middle East10, it is also apparent that British strategy and operations experienced problems 
that had little to do with their principal ally but were in fact home grown. Criticism of British 
operations in Iraq made by the American military demonstrates the point that the British bear 
some responsibility for problems being experienced in the military domain of the current war.11 
It is also clear that the Americans have also been extremely critical of the conduct of British 
                                                 
8 Mark Tran, „Al Qaeda will take decades to eradicate, think tank says‟ The Guardian Wednesday 12 
September 2007. Richard Norton Taylor, „Al Qaeda has revived, spread and is capable of a spectacular 
attack‟ The Guardian Thursday 13 September 2007 
9 http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politicsmod_ofamerica/war_on_terrorupdate 6 
December 2010 
10 See Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Next Attack: The Globalization of Jihad (London: Hodder 
and Stoughton, 2005) and Michael Sheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror 
(Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005). 
11 Luke Baker, „Britain defends Iraq role on U.S. editorial pages,‟ Washington Post 31 August 2007. 
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operations in Afghanistan.12 It is recognised that military force has only a supporting role to 
play in winning a war of this kind, however, events in this domain have jeopardised the 
political, social and economic dimensions of strategy and it is therefore critical to explain why 
the British military complex has failed so far to meet the challenges presented by this conflict.  
 
Problems with UK Grand Strategy and the War on Terror 
The British Government‟s response to the security challenge posed by Al Qaeda was to develop 
a multifaceted set of policies that could be loosely described as a grand strategy. Liddell Hart, 
one of the first to make use of this term, explained, the purpose of grand strategy was: `to 
coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of 
the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy.‟13  More recently 
Kennedy stated: „the crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in the capacity of the 
nation‟s leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non military, for the 
preservation and enhancements of the nation‟s long term best interests.‟14 In essence: “Grand 
strategy” integrates military, political, and economic means to pursue states‟ ultimate objectives 
in the international system.‟15  The British define grand strategy today in the following terms: 
 
(T)he coordinated application of the instruments of national power … in the pursuit of 
national policy aspirations. Accordingly it lies within the political domain, principally the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, with advice from the most senior military officers. The 
Government‟s political intentions, in relation to a specific campaign, may be articulated as a 
national strategic aim or end-state, based upon the outcome required and accompanied by 
associated strategic objectives.16 
                                                 
12 P Curtis, „Wikileaks cables on UK‟s Afghan role embarrassing, says Cameron The Guardian 7 
December 2010 
13 B Liddell Hart, Strategy (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2004), 86 
14 Paul Kennedy, 1991, p.5. 
15 Stephen Biddle, American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 
Army War College, April 2005, p.v. 
16 Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, British Defence Doctrine (London: HMSO, 2008), para.111. 
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Within the context of the war on terror national strategic level actions are articulated 
through a framework called CONTEST.17 This construct sets out the effects that a 
counter terrorist strategy must achieve if the threat is to be contained. CONTEST is 
divided into four areas: the prevention of terrorism by tackling radicalisation; pursuing 
terrorists and those who sponsor them; protecting the public and key services; and 
preparing for the consequences of a terrorist attack. Referred to as the Four Ps the armed 
forces contribute to the UK‟s national strategy for counter terrorism predominantly in 
Prevent and Pursue phases and in specialised elements of protect at home.18 The national 
strategic aim set by the government is: „to reduce the risk from international terrorism, 
so that people can go about their daily lives freely and with confidence.‟19  In truth, 
CONTEST is concerned mainly with the domestic aspect of the terrorist threat and is a 
strategy that is shaped and driven primarily by the Home Office.  However:  
 
Counter-insurgency work, including military, political engagement, development and 
reconstruction strands, is closely related to and coordinated with our counter-terrorism 
work. Although not formally part of CONTEST, counter-insurgency contributes to 
reducing the threat to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism. Like 
our counter-terrorism work counter-insurgency makes a vital contribution to our national 
security. 20 
 
As such the military has an important role to play in CONEST even though it is not formally 
linked to it.  This brings us to then to the military strategic domain of Britain‟s grand strategy. 
For the British: 
 
Military strategy links political aspiration, expressed in Government policy, and military 
feasibility. It is derived from national strategy and determines how the Armed Forces 
                                                 
17 HM Government. CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism  
CM7547 (London: HMSO, 2009) 
18 HM Government, Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdoms’s Strategy Cm 6888 
(London: HMSO, 2006), p.28. 
19 Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre British Defence Doctrine JDP0-001 (London: MOD, 2008), p.1-
4.  
20 Home Office Counter Terrorism Strategy 59 
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should be configured and employed, in conjunction with other instruments of national 
power, to achieve favourable outcomes.21 
 
UK military strategy operates within a conceptual framework that is designed to ensure it 
achieves strategic effects that support the political and economic dimensions of the campaign. 
To this end, military strategy and operations are guided by the following tenets. First, all 
military operations are sanctioned and under the control of the legitimate government. Second, 
the terrorist must be defeated within the existing rule of law which preserves the civil liberties 
of the UK population. Third, there must be a clear political aim and the military must be given 
clear political direction throughout. Fourth, the delivery of a successful strategy depends on a 
coordinated response between government departments and agencies. Fifth, both the 
government and the military need intelligence so that threats can be detected and acted upon 
and a discriminate military campaign can be conducted which limits innocent civilian casualties. 
Finally, strategy and operations must aim to isolate the terrorist from the civil population both 
physically and psychologically.22 
 
Based on this framework UK military strategy is designed to achieve a range of effects that can 
be subsumed under the 4 Ps. These are to: 
 prevent the conditions that give rise to terrorism by promoting stability and security 
within states and also to discourage state sponsorship of terrorism; 
 to deter terrorist attacks; 
 to actively coerce terrorists and state sponsors to stop their campaigns against the UK; 
 to disrupt terrorist organisations and cut off their access to all forms of support 
 to destroy terrorist cells and networks.23 
 
                                                 
21 Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre British Defence Doctrine JDP0-001 (London: MOD, 2008), p.1-
4.  
22 Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre Countering Terrorism; The UK Approach to the Military Contribution 
, p.12. 
23 Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre Countering Terrorism; The UK Approach to the Military Contribution 
p.14 
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Clearly, terrorist attacks on the UK homeland since 2005 and problems experienced in the 
military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that current strategy is not working, but 
what is the source of the problem?  
 
The implementation of Britain‟s grand strategy has been affected by four potential problems. 
The first and potentially most damaging problem is that the goal selected by the Government 
at the start of the war was incredibly ambitious.  For example a Cabinet Office report listed the 
objectives of the UK as: first, to protect the United Kingdom and its overseas territories and 
prevent further terrorist attacks; and second, eliminating terrorism as a force in international 
affairs. 24 The same objectives were set out in more detail in the Government‟s Campaign 
Objectives document, which was published on 4 October 2001. The overall objective was to 
eliminate terrorism as a force in international affairs. This meant not only stopping terrorist 
movements but also deterring state sponsorship of terrorist groups.25 However, in reality the 
need to eradicate the causes of terrorism has caused UK national strategy to open a Pandora‟s 
Box. 
 
The most obvious way of suffocating terrorism is to remove the cause, which entailed dealing 
with perceived corrupt and nepotistic regimes and promoting the spread of better governance 
which is usually equated with democracy. As Biddle explains, the logic underlying this strategy 
is that action of this kind will remove authoritarian regimes that use economic surpluses to 
reward loyal clients, whilst denying access to basic social and economic amenities for the 
majority. In those countries with fast growing populations these problems compound the 
predicament of poor governance. Many of these regimes have been happy to redirect their 
anger against perceived external threats like Israel and the West. This process of state 
                                                 
24 The Cabinet Office, The United Kingdom and the Campaign against International Terrorism Progress 
Report, 9 September 2002, p.3. 
25 International Coalition Against Terrorism, Campaign Objectives: 
http://www.fco.gove.uk/text_only?news/keythemehome.asp. 
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sponsored radicalisation became something of a problem when bin Laden began to channel this 
into a general anti Western campaign.26   
  
It is important to note that this is not just an American dream, but was also at the heart of 
British policy. Thus, when asked in 2006 whether the insurgency in Iraq represented a 
distraction from the war on terror, the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, argued that a military 
commitment was justified on the grounds that the only long term solution to the problems of 
the Middle East lay in the creation of democracy, which was precisely what they were trying to 
do in Iraq.27 As he explained: „what I am saying is we are seeing the beginnings of a movement 
for democracy which I believe is the only sure way of eliminating terror.‟28 Although the 
British had reined in their political ambitions in Afghanistan by summer 2007, aiming instead 
for good enough governance, the logic of the war on terror meant that. As the Foreign Office 
Minister, Lord Malloch Brown explained in 2009, if Afghanistan is to be a state free from the 
influence of terrorism then it is important to create economic and political conditions that 
prevent the return of the Taliban which means something that at least approximates 
democratic government.29   
 
The second problem is that the British system of government has proved ineffective in 
articulating its grand strategy. In theory at least, the process of combining various policy 
streams seems relatively straightforward.  At the pinnacle of this process are the Cabinet and 
its plethora of subcommittees. Directly beneath are the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO), which takes the lead on the international fight against terrorism and the Home Office 
which leads on domestic protection against terrorism. In the UK policy is formulated by these 
                                                 
26 Stephen Biddle, American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 
Army War College, April 2005, pp.21-24. 
27 HCFAC, (note 37) HC 573-I, Q 63. 
28 Ibid., Q 64 
29 Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan 8th Report 2008-09 HC 302 
(London: HMSO, 2009) Q 174 
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lead Departments under the political direction of the Cabinet. Within this framework MOD 
liaises with these Departments of State and is to some extent subordinate to them.30   
 
However, in reality competition rather than cooperation are the order of the day in this triad. 
This reflects the fact that structural and political drivers make meaningful cooperation 
extremely difficult. In terms of structure it is clear that each department of state guards its 
domain jealously and resents any encroachment by another government department in its 
affairs; a problem that is even more complicated because the Department for International 
Development (DfID) was originally part of the FCO. A classic illustration of such a „turf war‟ 
concerns the introduction of what is now known as the Comprehensive Approach; a strategy 
which was intended to achieve greater coordination between government departments in the 
stabilization and reconstruction of failed states.  This was originally an MOD construct, but 
when they had the temerity to suggest that the FCO and DfID adopt this strategy their 
proposal was rejected. What became clear was that each department had its own vision of how 
prosecute this conflict and resented MOD trying to take the lead. The result was a strange 
bureaucratic battle over what this construct should be called and precisely what role each 
department was to play within it.31 This divisiveness between departments is compounded 
because there is little institutional incentive to cooperate, especially when funding flows 
directly from the Treasury to each of department of state and cooperation could mean loss of 
money to another department‟s activities. An additional complication is that the political 
fortunes of secretaries of state and their ministers are inextricably linked to the performance of 
their respective government departments and this undermines the spirit of cooperation 
between senior politicians within the Cabinet.32  
 
                                                 
30 Ministry of Defence Joint Doctrine and Concept Centre, Countering Terrorism: The UK Approach p.19.  
 
31 Personal Interview 
32 Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O‟Leary, Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive (London: St 
Martin‟s Press, 1995), p.64. 
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The Prime Minister has the power to enforce cooperation through the Cabinet Office, but 
political conditions and the need to maintain a broad base of support for his or her policies 
sometimes means tolerating dissent even within Cabinet. For example, Tony Blair was forced 
to accept Claire Short‟s refusal to allow DfID to cooperate with MOD and the FCO in 
developing a Phase IV reconstruction plan for Iraq once hostilities ended, and this is believed to 
have hampered British efforts to quell the insurgency that arose in their area of operations after 
the war.33 This happened because Short‟s support for the Prime Minister was vital in 
presenting a united front to the wider public on the decision to invade Iraq in 2003.  
 
Lack of coordination between government departments at the national strategic level extended 
into Iraq and Afghanistan and this had a profound impact on reconstruction and development. 
In the case of Iraq getting British agencies to deploy and then coordinate with the military 
proved challenging. To succeed it was imperative that government departments were willing 
to support the army in its efforts to stabilize Iraq. Although in theory these departments of 
state should have been directed and controlled by a Cabinet subcommittee under the 
chairmanship of the Foreign Secretary, in reality no leadership was forthcoming. The 
committee met infrequently and was therefore unable to build a cross-departmental consensus 
on how to approach problems being faced in southern Iraq.34 The experience of Iraq led to a 
series of new doctrinal, procedural and organisational initiatives to promote greater 
coordination on the ground in post conflict states, but this came too late to make a real 
difference in Iraq. For example, the UK Stabilisation Unit, which coordinates post conflict 
reconstruction, began operating in Iraq only in 2006 and the first Provisional Reconstruction 
Team was set up later that year. 35 Hilary Synott, who was appointed by Blair to take charge of 
development and reconstruction in the British area of control in southern Iraq in 2003, made 
the observation that the British system of government made it impossible to have the effect 
needed on the ground in Iraq in 2003-04. Although the cabinet subcommittee drew together all 
the principal departments of state its chair did not have any real power and could not force 
                                                 
33 HCDC Lessons From Iraq HC 57, (London: HMSO, 2004),, Ev 440 
34 Sir Hilary Synott,  Bad Days in Basra (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008), p.10. 
35 Stabilisation Unit, Brief Details of main Stabilisation Unit work by country, p.1. 
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government ministers to comply with proposals and recommendations made.  In his view Blair 
should have appointed a senior minister and placed him or her in charge of reconstruction in 
Iraq. 36  
 
Ironically, in spite of the best efforts of the British to address this breakdown in cooperation, 
exactly the same problems erupted in Helmand in 2006. In spite of the existence of a 
comprehensive strategy involving all departments this aspiration failed to materialize once the 
operation was underway and as a result promised reconstruction and development in the 
province did not happen. This failure was blamed on the military which it is argued deviated 
from the plan and failed to liaise with the other government agencies. 37 
 
On paper at least the institutional structure was in place to ensure a coordinated response 
which predated the deployment to Helmand. For example, in 2004 MOD, FCO and DFID 
provided tri departmental funding for the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit. The deployment 
of UK forces to Iraq and Afghanistan encouraged MOD to codify this practice of increasing 
cooperation in a document called the Comprehensive Approach.38 This was not a prescriptive 
document but explained why the departments of state needed to cooperate more effectively in 
post conflict scenarios. It explained: 
 
The realisation of national strategic objectives inevitably relies on a combination of 
diplomatic, military and economic instruments of power, together with an independent 
package of developmental and humanitarian activity and a customised, agile and sensitive 
influence and information effort.39  
 
The Army, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department of International 
Development (DFID) made a considerable effort to construct a comprehensive plan that tied all 
                                                 
36 Synott 2010 27 
37 James Ferguson, A Million Bullets (London: Bantam Press, 2008), p.153 
38 The Comprehensive Approach, Joint Discussion Note 4/05, January 2006, MOD 
39 The Comprehensive Approach, Joint Discussion Note 4/05, January 2006, MOD pp1-2 
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the national levers of power political, economic and military into a coordinated process which 
was designed to deliver security, reconstruction and governance. The Joint UK Plan for 
Helmand was formed over a six week timeframe, involved hundreds of people and was finalised 
in December 2005.40  However, this plan became one of the first casualties of war as the British 
struggled to get to grips with the challenge of the Taliban in summer 2006.  What the British 
learned very quickly was that „you cannot have sustainable development without security, nor 
maintain security without development.‟41 
 
Thus, the absence of a secure environment in 2006 played an important role in DFID‟s decision 
not to deploy its staff until well into the deployment.  There was not even basic accommodation 
that offered sufficient protection to British civil servants in Helmand. The job had been given 
to the military but they did not have the time and so gave it to the Afghans and they took 
longer than expected to complete the project.42 The lack of security in Helmand in 2007 
continued to impact on the ability of DFID to carry out its tasks.  Its mission was complicated 
further as the original plan to focus development and reconstruction in the area of Lashkar Gar 
was extended to Gereshk, Sangin and Garmsir. This expansion was caused by the demands of 
the UK COIN campaign, but also the need to support the Kajaki Dam project.  Quite often it 
was difficult for DFID staff to leave the PRT base and the number of locations in which their 
staff could operate was limited. The cost of providing security also limited the range and 
number of charities willing to deploy in the province and in 2008 there were only four NGOs 
all based in Lashkar Gar. Apparently even the Provincial Governor Wafa, rarely ventured 
beyond Lashkar Gar.43  
 
In spite of the growth in structures and processes to promote greater coordination this capacity 
was undermined by a perceived philosophical difference between the military and DFID 
surrounding the allocation of money to reconstruction and development. In basic terms DFID 
                                                 
40 Author discussion with MOD civil servant in 2007 
41 International Development Committee, HC 65-II Ev 56 
42 James Ferguson, A Million Bullets (London: Bantam Press, 2008), p.175 
43 International Development Committee Reconstructing Afghanistan 4th Report HC 65-II 2007-08, 
(London: HMSO, 2008) Ev 53 
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was perceived to be failing to support the British campaign in Helmand. Between May 2006 
and March 2007, the British spent over a £1 billion on military operations, but only £102 
million on reconstruction and development for Afghanistan as a whole.44  This imbalance 
between military operations and aid was even more striking in Helmand where, in 2006-07, 
DFID provided a meagre £4 million in quick impact projects45. The ratio of funding for aid or 
war improved when on 12 December 2007 the Prime Minister announced stabilisation 
assistance of £450 million for the period 2009-12 for Afghanistan as a whole.46 £345 million 
was development money and £105 million was for quick impact projects, but it is not clear how 
much of this was to be invested in Helmand. 
 
However, from the perspective of the military DFID still was not doing enough. For example, 
an article written by an army major on DFIDs support to the wider campaign in Helmand in 
2008 was scathing. Based on an analysis of reconstruction  and development spending across 
Afghanistan‟s thirty four provinces he noted that the funding in Helmand was second to last, in 
the list of completed, ongoing and planned projects; only Zabul fared worse.  In his view this 
failure is the responsibility of DFID which chose to ignore quick impact projects in favour of 
more ambitious and loftier development goals.47 
 
This view has some basis. It is important to note that DfID channels 80 percent of its funding 
through the Afghan government. Although the British are the second largest aid donors most 
Afghans are not aware of this. When asked they refer to the French, Germans, and American 
efforts.48 However, channelling assistance in this way was believed to increase the capacity and 
legitimacy of the Afghan government. These funds were mainly channelled through 
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. Currently 27 nations contribute to the fund and the 
UK is the largest donor. The fund has two main strands payment of government salaries and 
                                                 
44 HCDC 13th Report, UK Operations in Afghanistan  HC 408 (London: HMSO: 2007), Q 30  
45 International Development Committee, HC 65II Ev.54 
46 Hansard Col 303-307 12 December 2007 
47 Major SN Miller „A Comprehensive Failure in British Civil Military Strategy in Helmand Province‟, 
RUSI Journal no.146 p.36-37 
48 International Development Committee Reconstructing Afghanistan 4th Report HC 65-I 2007-08, 
(London: HMSO, 2008) Ev 53 
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investment in development programmes.49  Within the context of Helmand DFID money flows 
through its support to the Helmand Agriculture and Rural Development Programme and the 
financial support it gives to QIPs.  Thus, institutional weaknesses have made it extremely 
difficult for the UK not just to realise and implement an effective grand strategy, but equally 
important, an effective strategic and even operational plan. 
 
The third potential problem is that current strategy assumes that failed states or `ungoverned‟ 
spaces are ripe for exploitation for the purposes of training and preparation of terrorist attacks 
against targets in the West.50  As the then Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, 
explained in 2003:  
 
Afghanistan demonstrates that a failed state, providing a harbour for terrorist 
organisations, means that the threat can strike us or our close allies from huge distances. 
Therefore we need to recognise that global environment in which we accept in almost 
every other respect that we have to face up to dealing with threats as far afield as they can 
come.51 
 
If the threat of failed states is accepted then contesting control of these ungoverned spaces is a 
resource and labour intensive process; by the end of 2008 the UK had spent over £13 billion on 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.52 Not only does it require forces to be deployed over the 
long term, equally important it also requires the UK to sustain a military capability that can 
operate on a global rather than regional scale, which is so costly that only a handful of nations 
                                                 
49 International Development Committee Reconstructing Afghanistan 4th Report HC 65-I 2007-08, 
(London: HMSO, 2008) Ev 53 
 
50 MOD, Defence White Paper 2003:Delivering Security in a Changing World Cm 6041, (London: HMSO, 
2003), para. 2.7. 
51 HCDC, Defence White Paper 2003 HC 465-I, 2003-04, (London: HMSO, 2003), Q113.  
52 Richard Norton Taylor, MOD bill for Afghan and Iraq conflict tops £13bn The Guardian 26 
November 2008. 
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possess such a capability.53  Furthermore it undermined the Government‟s previous efforts to 
impose a limit on the scale and scope of UK military operations. When the Government first 
came to power in 1997, their manifesto on defence declared a commitment to deal with a 
perceived fiscal crisis in this area of public policy, to tackle the problem of overstretch as units 
rotated in and out of conflicts without sufficient time for rest, recuperation and training, and 
bring about a new equilibrium in the ends and means of strategy.  To this end the Government’s 
Strategic Defence Review imposed a geographical boundary on where UK forces would deploy 
and a limit on the size and number of military operations the UK‟s armed forces would 
undertake concurrently. 54 Prosecution of the war on terror made it necessary to breach all 
these self imposed restrictions. 
 
Regime change and nation building also required a temporal adjustment in UK strategy in that 
forces were committed to operations extending over years and potentially decades, which is 
perhaps why in 2007 the British Army‟s Chief of the General Staff described the war on terror 
as a „generational conflict‟.55  The military play a central role in the process of nation building, 
as Freedman explains, whilst the military cannot resolve the problem of failing states on their 
own, they are vital in terms of generating the security needed for this process to take place. 
How long they remain will depend on a political resolution between the various factions within 
the state concerned. However, conflict resolution is typically be a protracted affair.56  Not only 
does this activity require a prolonged deployment of forces, ideally it also requires a force 
structure that is manpower intensive so that security can be provided to the population.  
 
                                                 
53 James Dunnigan How to Make War: The Comprehensive Guide to Modern Warfare for the Post-Cold War 
Era, New York: William and Morrow, 1993) p.291. 
54 MOD, The Strategic Defence Review Cm 3999 1997-98, (London: HMSO, 1998). 
55 See US National Security Strategy and Allan Mallinson, „How much longer can the Army Fight? The 
Daily Telegraph 7 August 2007. 
56  See Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs International Institute of Strategic 
Studies, Adelphi Paper 379, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), p.9. 
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The final problem facing national strategy relates to the constraints imposed on defence 
spending.  During the Cold War, Britain‟s ailing economy was perceived to have imposed a 
significant limit on defence spending.57 In contrast, during the war on terror, the UK‟s 
improved economic fortunes created the capacity to spend more on defence, but political 
circumstances imposed a different, but equally effective limit on defence spending.  Before the 
credit crunch in 2008 the UK experienced 15 years of consecutive economic growth, which was 
an unprecedented achievement in the UK‟s economic history. GDP for the first half of 2007 was 
3.25 percent, inflation was low, falling to 1.8 percent in August 2007, and employment reached 
a new high of over 29 million.58   
 
But whilst there has been a sustained increase in defence spending since 2002, the sums 
involved have not been generous and defence spending since 9/11 increased on average by 1.4 
percent in real terms per annum.59 To put this in context, inflation in the equipment 
programme, which consumes 44 percent of the budget, is on average between seven and eleven 
percent per annum.60 In the wider context of public spending, current government expenditure 
for 2007-08 was £589 billion with investment in the NHS standing at £90 billion.61 Today, 
the UK now commits only 2.2 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to defence 
compared with 2.8 percent in 1996-97 and approximately 5 percent of GDP during the Cold 
War, which means defence spending as a proportion of GDP is now at its lowest since the 
1930s.62  By mid 2008, the UK economy had moved into recession. The Government‟s response 
was to launch an ambitious programme of public spending in an effort to prevent the economic 
down turn becoming a depression. However, it is interesting to note that defence did not 
                                                 
57 See Richard Rosencrance, The Defence of the Realm (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968). 
58 The Treasury The 2007 Pre-Budget Report and Comprehensive Spending Review, http://www.hm-
treasury.gove.uk/media/8/Apbr_csr07_asnnexa_380.pdf p.133. 
59 The Government’s Expenditure Plans 2006-07 to 2007-08 Cmnd 6822 (London: HMSO, 2004). 
60 See Phillip Pugh, The Procurement Nexus Defense and Peace Economics, Vol.4, No 2, 1993 
61 The Treasury, The 2007 Pre-Budget Report and Comprehensive Spending Review, p.9. 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/6/7/pbr_csr07_chapter1_207.pdf  
62 Christopher Hope, „Defence spending lowest since the 1930s‟, The Daily Telegraph 24 January 2007. 
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benefit from the government‟s support for public works and public capital projects. Instead, big 
capital projects such as the £3.5 billion aircraft carrier programme were delayed and the 
army‟s planned £7billion acquisition of a new fleet of armoured vehicles was cancelled, 
producing a technical saving of £20 billion to fill a hole created in MOD‟s budget, caused in 
part by a 50 percent increase in the cost of operations in 2007.63  However, this brief flirtation 
with Keynesian demand management was put into reverse with the advent of a Conservative 
and Liberal Coalition Government in May 2010 which was firmly committed to reducing 
Government borrowing. Inevitably this had a big impact on defence and the ability of the UK 
to prosecute the war on terror. 
 
According to the Treasury, in 2009 the UK borrowed one pound for every four it spent and 
currently has over £43 billion in debt interest which is more than the defence budget of £34 
billion.  The Coalition Government‟s first priority was tackling the debt crisis and reducing the 
deficit as soon as possible.  This was seen as vital if the UK economic recovery was not to be 
jeopardised and long term economic growth was not sacrificed because of unsustainable debt.  
In an effort to tackle the deficit the Government implemented a 19% cut in public spending 
between 2010 and 2014; only health and the overseas aid budget were protected from these 
cuts.  Although defence faired reasonably well in this spending review; defence spending is due 
to fall in real terms by 7.5% over the next four years from.64  However, MOD has also been 
tasked to find an additional £38 billion saving to deal with a separate hole in its budget 
incurred because of poor financial planning and management, which means that the actual cut 
in defence over the next four years is closer to 20 percent.  
 
As a result, British national strategy demonstrates a fundamental mismatch between the object 
of the war and the means available to achieve the stated aim. The fundamental explanation for 
this classic error in higher strategy is that in the UK defence is not a national priority.  Even 
the newly elected Labour Government, which came to power in 1997 with a declared 
                                                 
63 HCDC 8th Report, Operational Costs in Afghanistan and Iraq: Spring Supplementary Estimate 2007-2008 
HC 400 (London: HMSO, 2008),p.8 
64 HM Treasury, Spending Review 2010  Cm 7942 (London: HMSO, 2010) 5-10 
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commitment to strong defence, recognised that defence spending was not a vote winner. As 
such, they were content to impose tough spending limits which resulted in defence expenditure 
falling in real terms by £917 million between 1997 and 2000.65  In theory at least 9/11 
changed this mindset and suddenly defence became important once more. For example 
according to the Foreign Affairs Committee: 
 
„The events of 11 September demonstrated clearly that a narrow definition of “national 
interest” is no longer sufficient. The international terrorist threat from organizations such 
as al Qaeda may be directed most immediately against the United States, but such attacks 
affect British interests and security, and may in future be directed against the United 
Kingdom.66 
 
The war against terrorism is an unplanned and unsought conflict. But when the first 
hijacked airliner struck the World Trade Center, war became necessary and, once entered 
upon, war must be pursued vigorously and with all appropriate means.‟ 67 
 
However, it is not clear the electorate ever shared this enthusiasm, especially once the UK and 
United States invaded Iraq. According to one poll, Blair‟s support for Iraq cost him dearly and 
his popularity fell to 20 percent in some surveys, his lowest poll rating ever. Similarly, support 
for the Labour Party also fell to a new low in 2003.  Overall fifty-two percent of people 
surveyed declared their opposition the war in Iraq.68 Equally important, In 2005, a survey 
organised by Chatham House found that 75 percent of respondents believed that the UK‟s 
frontline position in the war on terror and its decision to invade Iraq increased the chances of a 
terrorist attack against the UK and played a direct role in causing the attacks in London 7/7.69  
                                                 
65 House of Commons Defence Committee, The Strategic Defence Review 
66 HCFAC, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism 2001-2002, (London: HMSO, 2002), p.16. 
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69 Julian Glover, „Two-thirds believe London bombings are linked to Iraq War‟, The Guardian, 19 July 
2005 
   MnM Working Paper No. 4   19 | P a g e  
 
The absence of strong public support for the war and the government‟s own political priorities 
which focused on maintaining a stable economy, health, education and effective welfare 
provision served to ensure that the war on terror operated within a tight budget.  This problem 
has not been explicitly addressed by the current Coalition Government‟s defence and security 
review. Instead it has attempt to ensure that Britain‟s forces will in the future be employed 
more carefully and will be deployed „only where key national interests are at stake; where we 
have a clear strategic aim; where the likely political, economic and human costs are in 
proportion to the likely benefits; where we have a viable exit strategy and where justifiable 
under international law.70  Whilst this might be helpful in future interventions it does little do 
deal with the immediate crisis facing the UK in Afghanistan and the current Government‟s 
strategy differs little from that of its predecessor in that it is relying on the ability of the 
Afghan Government to develop the capacity to provide security and stability to its people, a 
capability that many doubt the Afghans will acquire in the timeframe set by the international 
community. 
 
An important symptom of the failure to balance ends and means has been a pronounced 
increase in over stretch of forces deployed on operations.  In January 2007, General Dannatt, 
the Chief of the General Staff, urged the government to reduce the Army‟s commitments. 
Fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had almost exhausted the army, which was 
configured to fight only one medium and one small conflict simultaneously.71  According to 
Major General Ritchie, the Army was being asked to do almost double what was anticipated in 
the defence planning assumptions.72 In practical terms this meant that many units were not 
having the recommended two year break between operations, but current tour intervals are 
under 10 months on average and in some cases this is as little as two months.73 When asked, 
                                                 
70  MOD, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review Cm 7948 
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two former service chiefs expressed the view that unless commitments were reduced in 2008 
hard choices in the defence budget would have to be made.74 The delay in the carrier 
programme and the cancellation of the army‟s armoured vehicle fleet at the end of 2008 
demonstrate how prescient these comments were. Lack of domestic support, financial 
stringency, and poor planning at the national strategic level had a profound impact on the 
conduct of British military strategy and operations.   
 
Problems with the UK’s military Strategy and Operations 
Military strategy is the creative application of resources (means) to achieve the political object 
of the war (ends), which means that the most basic parameters of military strategy are in fact 
set at the level of national strategy. As the history of warfare demonstrates, establishing the 
correct balance between ends and means is vital if victory is to be achieved. Obviously, a 
cunning strategy can compensate where resources are lacking as demonstrated by the victories 
achieved by smaller and weaker forces against great military powers, which has become a more 
pronounced phenomenon since 1945.75 
  
In the case of the war on terror American military strategy has been heavily criticised. This 
debate has focused on two related themes. The first is a generic problem confronting regular 
armed forces fighting irregular wars.  As Gray explains:  
 
Most of the world‟s armed forces are not well designed, doctrinally prepared, trained and 
equipped to wage war against elusive handfuls of religious fanatics. Rather, they are raised 
and maintained to fight regular enemies who would be approximate facsimiles of 
themselves.76 
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The early efforts of the United States to deal with the insurgency in Iraq have been cited as 
proof that conventional military forces struggle to deal with irregular opponents.77  This failure 
to adapt was attributed to the institutional culture of the organisation and its preference for 
regular warfare.78  
 
The second criticism made of US military strategy was that it failed to understand that Al 
Qaeda was not just conducting a terrorist campaign, but is also fighting a global insurgency.79  
The distinction between such forms of irregular war is important because each requires a 
different counter strategy. As Morris explains, terrorism, irrespective of how powerful it is in a 
destructive sense, does not command extensive support and so in political terms terrorist 
groups are generally weak because they are not connected with the society of which they are a 
part and negotiation is rarely desirable or necessary. In these circumstances, military action 
should focus on protecting the population and hunting the terrorists down using national and 
international police resources, the military, diplomatic and economic actions.80  
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A very different strategy is required to deal with an insurgency, because it represents both a 
political and a military challenge. In this context the war of ideas is just as important as the war 
between forces. However, ideology alone, no matter how persuasive the message, will not result 
in victory by itself. Most important, when making an assessment of the effectiveness of an 
insurgent group are the means available to them and the strategy they use to coordinate and 
orchestrate their resources to achieve their political goals. In practical terms, this means 
engaging and mobilising the population to support a group‟s political agenda, institutionalising 
that base of support through the creation of a shadow government and initiating a campaign of 
violence, which may also embrace terrorism, in an effort to erode the will of the opponent 
through a protracted guerrilla war.  According to Morris, Al Qaeda appears to be tapping into 
two insurgent strategies. The first is based on a Maoist based model of revolutionary war and 
the second relies on Che Guevara‟s concept of Foco theory.81   
 
However, in the case of the UK, problems in military strategy had little to do with the 
philosophical failings of the UK military and or a failure to understand the nature of the enemy. 
In truth, it is clear that the British possess a good understanding of the demands of irregular 
warfare. It is also clear that the UK military do not see counter terrorism and counter 
insurgency in such stark and opposing terms as critics of US strategy. For example, in the case 
of Northern Ireland the British exploited techniques from both domains in what was essentially 
a counter terrorist campaign. Most important however was the fact that the British maintained 
a security force that was in excess of 30,000 soldiers and police to secure control over a 
population of just over a million people and approximately 300 IRA terrorists. An important 
lesson learned is that force to population ratios do matter.82  
 
Instead, British military strategy has been shaped by fragile domestic political support for the 
war, a lack of money and manpower and a lack capability in campaigns such as Iraq and 
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Afghanistan. These constraints created an imbalance between ends and means, and in an effort 
to address this deficiency, a great deal of emphasis has been placed on the exploitation of 
technology as a substitute. In essence, British military operations shifted from a labour 
intensive model of irregular warfare to a capital intensive model.  Thus, although the initial 
response of MOD to 9/11 was sold in terms of a mere extension or enhancement of existing 
policy,83 in reality, The New Chapter was to have a profound impact on the size, scale, 
deployment, cost and endurance of the UK‟s armed forces.  It declared that the full spectrum of 
military capabilities would be required to deter terrorist attacks.  Interestingly, this included 
the retention of Trident nuclear weapons. Although designed to deal with a major strategic 
threat to the UK, it was believed that the possession of this weapon could deter rogue states 
from either using or providing chemical, biological, radioactive or nuclear (CBRN) materials to 
terrorists determined to make a weapon of mass destruction (WMD).84   
 
The New Chapter also reaffirmed a commitment to create and sustain an expensive capability to 
project military power on a global basis which had been made originally in SDR.85  It was also 
deemed important for MOD to invest in the development of a range of new technologies that 
provided UK forces with an extensive surveillance capability over potentially vast areas of land 
and sea, and the ability to conduct rapid and decisive attacks against fleeting targets using a 
variety of new weaponry.86  Substituting manpower with technology was intended to save 
money by ensuring that a small force could punch above its weight.87  The importance of 
technology to future defence capability was noted by the Defence Committee:  
 
UK forces have the advantage of extensive experience in handling low intensity operations, 
where networking can be highly effective. It can help relatively small numbers of troops or 
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platforms to cover large tasks or geographical areas through rapid and flexible 
deployments.88 
 
Of critical importance here was the investment made in Networked Enabled Capability (NEC): 
 
NEC is crucial to the rapid delivery of military effect. The SDR New Chapter recognised 
NEC as being fundamental in countering terrorism abroad, with its ability to deliver precise 
and decisive military effects, with unparalleled speed and accuracy through linking sensors, 
decision makers and weapons systems. Clearly, its applicability and utility is much broader 
than that and will involve effective integration of military capability. When implemented, it 
will allow us to prosecute the full range of contingent operations with greater awareness, 
confidence and control.89 
 
In general, current military strategy operates on the assumption that the introduction of new 
technology will allow smaller forces to do more in terms of: „responding quickly and decisively 
to achieve maximum effect and should also act as a force multiplier, allowing the same military 
effect to be achieved with less.‟90  In essence, we appear to be moving towards the Toffler‟s 
vision of a `demassified‟ battle space.91 However, the Defence Committee was sceptical of the 
merits of this approach. In their view, the obsession with the mass effects being produced via 
non mass forces was going to limit what the military could do. 
 
The Committee suggested a rather cynical reasoning for these changes: 
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The suspicion has grown that the focus on agility without mass and the move away from a 
platform focus has less to do with an intellectually coherent strategy of effects based 
warfare than with a need to `cut our cloth‟ as best we can.92 
 
They were also rather concerned that cut back on the numbers of systems already in service 
whilst waiting to acquire new, but unproven capabilities, was a risky strategy. There was no 
guarantee that those capabilities would be provided or that they would work.93  Moreover, in 
their view, the demands of the changing strategic environment seemed to suggest that more 
manpower and equipment rather than less needed. 94 Most important is the fear that whilst Al 
Qaeda is fighting an insurgency which aims to wear down the forces ranged against it in a war 
of attrition, British forces are not configured so that they can endure significant casualties and 
the relatively small pool of infantry in the British Army has proved vulnerable to attrition 
inflicted by insurgent groups.  In the case of Afghanistan, it is estimated that infantry 
battalions have suffered casualty rates of almost 11 percent, which is comparable to the casualty 
rates experienced during the Second World War.95   
 
Lack of troops and or resources has made it very difficult for the UK to achieve its goals in 
either Iraq or Afghanistan. In the case of Iraq it was clear that the UK did not have sufficient 
force to control the six million Iraqis under its control. Overall, troop levels fell drastically 
during the summer of 2003 from 26,000 to 9,000 to cover four provinces and in 2005 there 
were only 7,200 British troops in the region. This meant that forces were stretched thinly on 
the ground. In 2003 the British deployed a force of 1,000 men to provide security in Maysan, an 
area the size of Northern Ireland which included the city of Ammara with a population of over 
400,000. This also entailed deploying a force of just seventy soldiers to secure a 200 mile 
border with Iran.96  In contrast, in Northern Ireland the ratio of soldiers to civilians was 
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approximately 1:50, in the case of Iraq that ratio was 1:370.97 Similar problems arose in 
Afghanistan when the British took control of Helmand province. Although there were over 
3000 troops in the brigade only a single battalion of 600 troops was available to secure control 
over a population of one million people. Since then the UK‟s military commitment to 
Afghanistan has increased to over 8,000 troops, but this is still not enough to secure control in 
area strongly contested by the Taliban.  So badly overstretched were UK forces that the Chief 
of the General Staff warned the Government in July 2007 that the Army had only a reserve of a 
single battalion of 500 men to respond to a national emergency such as a terrorist strike in the 
UK.98  
 
It is important to note that under resourcing of UK stabilisation operations extended beyond 
the military realm and compounded the UK‟s difficulties in terms of containing the insurgencies 
it faced in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In the case of Iraq even though the British made 
promises to support reconstruction in the south east (Multi National Division South East 
[MND SE]) of the country it proved reluctant to provide the money needed to achieve this 
goal. Sadly it was the riots on 9-10 August 2003, caused by the failure of the British to restore 
basic services to the population, which made the British government realise how tenuous their 
hold on the region was and how desperate was the plight of the people. As a result the 
government accepted that it was going to be responsible orchestrating the reconstruction and 
stabilisation in their area and equally important provide significant funding to facilitate this 
process. In response, the UK finally approved £500 million for reconstruction, but five months 
were lost before this money became available. Moreover, although that sum was subsequently 
increased in 2007 to £700 million99 it was still short of the estimated $7.2 billion engineers 
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believed was needed to repair the region‟s physical infrastructure in 2003.100 Similar problems 
also arose in Afghanistan. In this case the British prepared a detailed plan for its intervention in 
Helmand in December 2005, but the plan was extremely ambitious and was shaped by more by 
the aspirations of Tony Blair rather than the reality on the ground. Although the Post Conflict 
Reconstruction Unit believed the concept needed to be scaled back, the political pressure from 
the Cabinet ensured that the scale and ambition of the plan remained intact. However no 
additional resources were allocated and government departments remained concerned about 
the feasibility of the operation.101  
 
But even if more soldiers were available for operations this would not necessarily result in a 
reduction in the UK‟s dependence on a capital intensive mode of warfare. In part this is because 
some of this technology is actually very useful. For example, all Taliban communications via 
mobile phone or radio are monitored by NATO forces which means the Taliban have to rely on 
more basic forms of communication which has made their efforts to coordinate large scale 
attacks above the size of a company almost impossible. Similarly aerial surveillance systems 
have played a critical role in protecting UK forces from ambushes and booby traps, which has 
kept military casualties to a minimum. It is this last goal which makes technology such an 
important force multiplier for the British. As a result, operations and tactics have been shaped 
by a heavy reliance on modern firepower to kill the enemy at a distance so that they cannot 
engage British forces. A good illustration of this is the deployment of the Multiple Launch 
Rocket System to Afghanistan in 2007. This weapon can fire salvoes of twelve rockets up to a 
distance of 70 km with each rocket delivering death and destruction over an area the size of an 
American football pitch. Similarly when fighting in villages and district centres it has not been 
uncommon for British soldiers to use Javelin surface to air missiles against Taliban snipers 
hiding in mud brick buildings. The British have also demonstrated a great reliance on air 
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support to defend its positions and assist in offensive operations. This has entailed a cocktail of 
munitions ranging from 540 pound unguided bombs, 1000 pound guided bombs and 
occasionally Maverick guided anti tank missiles.  The combined effect of this „kinetic effect‟ has 
saved the lives of British military personnel, but tragically it has become a principal cause of 
death for innocent civilians in Afghanistan. The UN estimate nearly 400 civilians were killed 
by air strikes alone in the first eight months of 2008 a 21 percent increase compared to the 
same period in 2007, and accounted for nearly two thirds of 577 non combatant deaths 
attributed to pro Government forces. 102  Such action, whilst limiting the UK government‟s 
exposure to the domestic political fallout caused by casualties, has produced political problems 
for the Afghan government.  Not only does this demonstrate its inability to control its western 
allies, which undermines its credibility in the eyes of ordinary Afghans, the use of air power in 
this way also demonstrates that NATO/ISAF care more about its military personnel than the 
people of Afghanistan. As a result Hamid Karzai has been extremely critical of the counter 
insurgency campaign being waged by the West in Afghanistan. 103 Not surprisingly, the 
Taliban‟s media machine has exploited the civilian casualties caused by bombing in an effort to 
turn the population against the Afghan government and western intervention.104 
 
Finally the UK‟s military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have fed Al Qaeda‟s propaganda 
machine and this is impacting on the domain of British national strategy. As one analyst 
observed:  
 
Al Qaeda videotapes and websites demonstrate the great importance they attach to 
propaganda. Recently they have expanded into broadcasting their own news programme 
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called the Voice of the Caliphate which attempts to use world events to put over their 
movements‟ perverted doctrines.105 
 
Iraq plays a very important part in the propaganda war. As TV journalist Peter Taylor 
explained in 2006: 
 
I am very worried about Iraq. I see it as a potential Vietnam. They use the situation there 
to recruit, to propagandise, to fund raise, to train and also to plan and operate.106 
Apparently, the Americans are only spending 3 percent of their defence budget on public 
diplomacy, which is much less than was spent on the production of information during 
the Cold War.107 The British Government currently spends £10 million funding a 
programme called Engaging the Islamic World.108  
 
Most ironic is the view that British military strategy and operations have played a critical role 
in increasing the threat posed by the Muslim community in the UK.  Perceived wars of 
aggression fought by the UK and US are supposedly radicalising the British Muslim population 
to the extent that members of the British Muslim community are willing to conduct attacks 
within the UK.109 It is estimated by MI5 that there are currently more than thirty terrorist 




The British have always understood that the solution to the problem of terrorism lies not in 
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military but rather political action that addresses the social and economic ills that are feeding 
the conflict.  On a paper at least, the UK‟s national has strategy operated entirely on this 
premise. However, whilst the broad principles underlying the British approach to the war on 
terror remain sound, national and military strategy have been undermined by a series of 
problems, some of which stem from its allies, important flaws also exist within the British 
polity which has undermined the creation and implementation of an effective grand strategy 
and military strategy. First and foremost has been the lack of a rigorous analysis concerning 
the aims and objectives of this conflict and what is particularly striking is the tension that has 
emerged in the government‟s relations with the military over the failure to relate ends and 
means. As a result of poor decision making and sometimes poor advice given by elements of the 
military the UK has become committed to a series of wars that have proved costly and which 
ironically have played to the strengths of the opponent who is committed to a long and 
protracted struggle.  Even more frustrating has been the inability of the government, because 
of a lack of coordination within the system, to exploit the national levers of power, political, 
economic and military to concentrate the UK‟s national power and influence in this war. 
Instead conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq became weeping sores, which exacerbated the drain 
on scarce resources. Additional investment has been made, but only reluctantly which reveals a 
more deep rooted problem caused by the government‟s failure to persuade the domestic 
population that the war on terror is necessary.  Unfortunately, as the current recession bites, 
the pressure to limit defence spending looks set to create new challenges in the ends and means 
debate.  This failure to relate ends and means has also impacted on the military strategic 
domain.  In an effort to redress the ends means gap, the UK military has had to place a greater 
reliance on technology acting as force multiplier than was desirable in a war of this kind and it 
is clear that the British have experienced significant problems in Afghanistan and Iraq because 
of their reliance on technology.  Lack of money for wider development has also been a problem. 
In the case of Iraq the lack of financial support to all the levers of power: political, economic and 
military, meant that the British failed to stabilise the south east of the country. In the case of 
Afghanistan, whilst a coordinated plan and money were available, the lack of an effective 
military capability made it impossible to create a secure environment in which development 
could begin and as a result the campaign became dominated by „kinetic‟ as opposed to „hearts 
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and minds‟ operations. Indeed a profound and unintended consequence of the war so far has 
been the way that military operations have come to dominate the public‟s perception of the war 
on terror. In 2007, Tony Blair claimed that: `we could have chosen security as the 
battleground. But we did not. We chose values.‟111  That may well have been the intention, but 
ironically the UK‟s military strategy caused the security battlefield to dominate British and 
global perceptions of this war, so much so that it has given Al Qaeda the chance to open a new 
front in this war within the UK itself.  Sadly the current Coalition Government‟s Defence and 
Security Review (SDSR) has done little to address these problems.  In fact, the commitment to 
capital intensive force structures remains very much to the fore; a fact amply demonstrated by 
the Government‟s commitment to procure two large aircraft carriers and the Joint Strike 
Fighter, the combined cost of which is likely to exceed £10 billion over the next decade. 112 
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